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21 An introduction to status equilibrium
This paper introduces the concept of a ‘status equilibrium’ in the context
of an economy with local public goods. A status equilibrium endogenously
determines a status index for each agent in the economy. The status of a
player determines what he pays for the public good in his allocated jurisdic-
tion and also what he would pay in any other jurisdiction he might join.1
In the remainder of this section of the paper, we provide a more detailed
description of the equilibrium concept, the model, and the results. Since a
status equilibrium is a new concept, there are many open questions; in a
concluding section, we report on research in progress dealing with some of
these.
Recall that a (pure) public good is a commodity that can be consumed
in its entirety by all agents in an economy; consumption of the good by
an additional agent does not decrease the amount available to the other
members of the society. Thus, unlike the situation for private goods, cost-
sharing rules for public goods cannot be determined by competition between
agents for the available supplies of the commodity. In an economy with
local public goods, as suggested by Tiebout (1956), public goods are subject
to possible congestion and also to exclusion. Thus, if there are suﬃciently
many players, local public goods can be optimally provided to proper subsets
of the population, which we will call jurisdictions, where members of each
jurisdiction consume only the public goods provided for that jurisdiction. We
1One might compare equilibrium status indices to Walrasian equilibrium prices. An
equilibrium price vector determines the cost of the equilibrium bundle purchased by each
agent and also the cost of any alternative bundle that he might consider purchasing — but
does not wish to do so since he can be no better oﬀ. Similarly equilibrium status indices
determine the cost share an agent would have to pay in each possible jurisdiction that he
might join — but does not wish to do so since he can be no better oﬀ.
3note that in much of the literature there is no distinction between club goods
and local public goods and between jurisdictions and clubs.
Various solutions to the problem of allocation of costs of public good
provision have been proposed. The most well-known is perhaps the Lin-
dahl equilibrium, introduced in Lindahl (1919) and formalized in Samuelson
(1954), Johansen (1963), and Foley (1970). As formalized by Samuelson, the
Lindahl equilibrium permits individuals to pay personalized prices for pub-
lic goods. In contrast, however, in a Lindahl equilibrium, according to our
reading of his paper, agents pay shares of the total costs and, in equilibrium,
these shares must satisfy the property that the amount of public good pro-
vided is the same for all individuals, given their cost shares.2 Other papers
have taken approaches in a similar spirit, with individuals paying shares of
costs rather than per unit prices; see, for example, Kaneko (1977a,b), and
Mas-Colell and Silvestre (1989,1991).
In the current paper, we study local public good economies or, in other
words, economies with clubs. In such economies, agents form jurisdictions
and each jurisdiction provides a local public good to its members; a good
that can be consumed in its entirety by all members of the jurisdiction, while
non-members are excluded from consumption. In a status equilibrium for an
economy with local public goods, the status index of an agent determines
his share of costs in any jurisdiction he might join. Roughly, an equilibrium
includes a specification of a partition of the set of agents into jurisdictions, a
production of local public goods for each jurisdiction, an allocation of private
goods for each agent, and a status index for each agent. The relative status
of an agent in any jurisdiction to which he might belong is given by his
2In a recent paper, van den Nouweland, Tijs, and Wooders (2002) axiomatize the ratio
equilibrium cost-sharing rule by means of consistency properties, where the consistency
property used is very much in the spirit of Lindahl’s original work.
4status index divided by the sum of the status indices of all the agents in the
jurisdiction. The relative status of an agent in a jurisdiction gives his share
of the costs of public good provision in that jurisdiction.3
A point we wish to emphasize is that status indices reflect relative shares
of costs that agents in various jurisdictions shoulder and thus a status equi-
librium depends on only one set of indices – we associate with each decision-
making agent i a single index si that reflects the agent’s relative burden in
all possible jurisdictions and for all possible levels of public good production.
We note that, in contrast, extensions of the Lindahl equilibrium (as formal-
ized in Samuelson 1954 and Johansen 1963) to local public good economies
depend on the use of a price for each agent for each jurisdiction he might
possibly join (cf. Wooders 1997) while extensions of the Walrasian equilib-
rium to local public goods economies depend on an infinite number of prices
– one for each triple consisting of an agent, a jurisdiction that the agent can
join, and a level of local public good that can be produced in the jurisdiction
(cf. Conley and Wooders 2001).
In this first preliminary paper, we provide an axiomatic characterization
of status equilibria.4 Our axiomatic characterization revolves around a con-
sistency property that is an extension of the consistency property used in
van den Nouweland, Tijs, and Wooders (2002). Hence, the axiomatization
of the status equilibrium for local public good economies provides both an
evaluation of this concept on the basis of its properties and a justification
3In the context of our local public goods economy model, status indices also might be
viewed as ‘responsibility indices,’ since, among the set of agents in one jurisdiction, those
agents with highest index numbers will have the largest responsibility for payment of costs
of local public good provision.
4Axiomatic characterization of solution concepts is a well established approach. Recent
contributions to the literature using such approaches include, for example Moulin (2000),
Dhillon and Mertens (1999), and Maskin (1999).
5for this concept as the proper extension of the Lindahl equilibrium for pure
public good economies.
Our model in this paper is too general to address questions of existence
of equilibrium, relationship of equilibrium outcomes to outcomes that are
stable against group formation (the core), and comparative statics, for exam-
ple. Research on these topics is in progress, some using the Conley-Wooders
crowding types model (cf., Conley and Wooders 2001) so that the status
equilibrium can be compared to other equilibrium concepts in the literature
for such economies.
2 Local public good economies
This section is devoted to formal definitions. Discussion in this paper is re-
stricted to economies with two goods, one public and one private. The results
can easily be extended to economies with an arbitrary finite number of public
goods. Doing this does not require any structurally diﬀerent argumentation,
but it does require more complicated notation. We prefer to avoid distracting
technical matters and thus limit ourselves to economies with one public good
and one private good.
Formally, a local public good economy is a list
E = hN,D; (wi)i∈N ; (ui)i∈N ; fDi,
where N (sometimes denoted N(E)) is the non-empty finite set of agents
in the economy, D ⊆ N (or D(E)) is the set of decision-making agents in
the economy, wi ∈ R+ is the non-negative endowment of agent i ∈ N of a
private good, ui : R+ × R+ × 2N → R is the utility function of agent i, and
fD : R+ × 2N → R+ is the cost function for the production of local public
good in jurisdictions. If agent i consumes an amount xi of the private good
6and an amount y of the local public good provided in jurisdiction J ⊆ N of
which agent i is a member (i ∈ J), then agent i enjoys utility ui(xi, y, J). We
assume that ui is strictly increasing in both private and (local) public good
consumption.
Production of local public good requires input of private good. In a
jurisdiction J , the cost of producing y units of the local public good, which
is borne by the decision-making agents in J , is fD(y, J) units of the private
good. The cost function fD is non-decreasing in the level of (local) public
good. Hence, if each of the decision-making members i ∈ J∩D in jurisdiction
J ⊆ N contributes an amount zi of the private good toward the production
of the local public good, then a bundle y of the local public good can be
provided if the feasibility condition fD(y, J) ·
P
i∈J∩D zi is satisfied. The
family of all public good economies is denoted by E .
Note that the distinction between decision-making agents (those inD(E))
and non decision-making agents (those in N(E)\D(E)) in an economy E is
that the decision-making agents bear the cost of local public good provision
fD(·, ·) while non decision-making agents bear none of these costs. It is
easiest to think about the cost fD(y, J) as the residual cost to the decision-
making agents, after subtracting the cost-shares of agents in N(E)\D(E)).
The motivation for introduction of a set of decision makersD, not necessarily
equal to N , is in defining reduced economies when studying consistency in
Subsection 4.1. We will explain this motivation in more detail in that section.
A specification of the jurisdictions formed, the levels of local public good
provided in those jurisdictions, and private good consumption by the agents
in the economy is called a configuration. Hence, a configuration in a local
public good economy E with set of agents N is a vector
(x,y,P) = ((xi)i∈N , (yP )P∈P,P),
7where xi ∈ R+ is the consumption of the private good by agent i for each
i ∈ N , P is a partition of N into jurisdictions, and yP ∈ R+ is the level of
local public good provided in jurisdiction P⊆N for each P ∈ P. We denote
the set of configurations in a local public good economy E with set of agents
N by C(N).
3 The status equilibrium
A status equilibrium for a local public good economy consists of a vector of
status indices - one for each decision-making agent in the economy - and a
configuration. The status indices determine the method according to which
decision-making agents share the cost of the production of local public good
in all possible jurisdictions; thus, if he is a member of jurisdiction J ⊆ N . a
decision-making agent i ∈ D with status si pays the share si/
³P
j∈J∩D sj
´
of the cost of local public good production in that jurisdiction. Hence, the
status indices determine the relative cost shares paid by the decision-making
agents in each jurisdiction that might possibly form. A set of status in-
dices and a configuration constitute a status equilibrium if every decision-
making agent’s membership of a jurisdiction and consumption as specified
by the configuration are utility-maximizing in his budget set as determined
by his (relative) status and, moreover, in every jurisdiction that is formed,
all decision-making members demand the same level of local public good.
Moreover, given the share of the cost of local-public good production that he
has to shoulder in various jurisdictions as determined by the status indices,
each decision-making agent prefers the jurisdiction to which he is assigned
in equilibrium. Note that, in a status equilibrium, decision-making agents
agree on all three of the following: the cost shares arising from their status
indices, the jurisdictions formed, and a level of local public good production
8for each jurisdiction that is formed. Agreement on the status indices deter-
mining cost shares, formation of jurisdictions, and levels of local public good
are inextricably linked.
Formally, for a local public good economyE = hN,D; (wi)i∈N ; (ui)i∈N ; fDi,
a set of status indices is a vector s = (si)i∈D ∈ RD. For each agent
i ∈ D and each jurisdiction J ⊆ N , agent i’s relative status in J is sJ,Di :=
si/
³P
j∈J∩D sj
´
. Also, if P is a partition ofN , then for each i ∈ N we denote
the jurisdiction of which agent i is a member by P (i), so that i ∈ P (i) ∈ P.
A pair consisting of a set of status indices and a configuration (s, (x,y,P))
is a status equilibrium in economy E if for each i ∈ D(E),
1. s
P (i),D
i fD(yP (i), P (i)) + xi = wi, and,
2. for all (xi, y, J) ∈ R+× R+× 2N satisfying i ∈ J and sJ,Di fD(y, J)+xi =
wi, it holds that ui(xi, yP (i), P (i)) ≥ ui(xi, y, J).
The set of status equilibria of an economyE = hN,D; (wi)i∈N ; (ui)i∈N ; fDi
is denoted SE(E).
Note that the status indices appear only in a relative manner, so that
if (s, (x,y,P)) is a status equilibrium in an economy E, and α > 0, then
(αs, (x,y,P)) is also a status equilibrium in economy E.
4 An axiomatization of the status equilibrium
It is apparent that SE is a special case of a mapping φ that assigns to each
public good economy E ∈ E a set of pairs each consisting of a vector of
numbers and a configuration, i.e.
φ(E) ⊆ RD(E) × C(N(E)).
9We will call such a mapping a solution on E . We consider various proper-
ties of such solutions and show that these properties characterize the status
equilibrium axiomatically. At the heart of our axiomatizations is the idea of
consistency.
4.1 Consistency
Consistency states that agreements reached in subgroups of agents should
be the same as those reached in the group consisting of all agents, as long
as the same method of reaching agreements is used in all groups. Suppose
that the agents in a local public good economy agree on their status indices
and a level of local public good for each jurisdiction formed. The method of
reaching agreements is consistent if no subgroup R of agents has an incentive
to change the agreement while taking the status indices of the agents in N\R
as given. That means that the agents in R have no incentive to change their
own status indices, the jurisdictions they want to be a member of, or the levels
of local public good for those jurisdictions. Notice that the agents in N\R do
not leave the economy, but only the decision-making process. They still are
present in the jurisdictions and shoulder their previously agreed-upon share
of the cost of local public good production in their assigned jurisdictions.
This is the reason why we needed to introduce a set of decision-making
agents in local public good economies and to allow for the presence on non
decision-making agents as well.
We now formally introduce reduced economies. Take a local public good
economy E = hN,D; (wi)i∈N ; (ui)i∈N ; fDi and let R ⊆ D, R 6= ∅,5 and
(s, (x,y,P)) a status equilibrium of E. The reduced economy of E with
respect to R and (s, (x,y,P)) is the economy in which the set of decision-
5Think of R as standing for ”reduced-economy decision-making agents”.
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making agents is R, so
ER,(s,(x,y,P)) = hN,R; (wi)i∈N ; (ui)i∈N , fRi,
where
fR(y, J) =
" X
i∈J∩R
sJ,Di
#
fD(y, J)
for all y ∈ R+ and J ⊆ N .
The idea behind the definition of the reduced economy is as follows. Sup-
pose all the decision-making agents agree on the status indices s and con-
figuration (x,y,P). This implies that they agree on cost-sharing schemes
corresponding to the status indices s, formation of local jurisdictions P, and
levels of local public good production for each of those jurisdictions. Then,
if, in addition to the agents in N\D, the agents in D\R also withdraw from
the decision-making process, the agents in R can reconsider the jurisdictions
that they form, the levels of local public good to be produced in those juris-
dictions, and their relative shares of the residual cost of producing the local
public good. When they reconsider, they take into account that the agents
in D\R have agreed to their status indices and will pay their corresponding
shares for the cost of local public good production in the jurisdiction that they
end up in. Hence, when reconsidering the cost-sharing scheme, the agents
in R face the residual cost fR(y, J) =
h
1−Pi∈J∩(D\R) sJ,Di i fD(y, J) =hP
i∈J∩R s
J,D
i
i
fD(y, J) for producing a level y of local public good in a
jurisdiction J .
A solution is consistent if, once agreement on relative cost shares has been
reached, the withdrawal of some agents from the decision-making process will
not influence the final outcome of the process. The consistency property is
defined using reduced economies. A solution φ on E is consistent (CONS) if
11
it satisfies the following condition.
If E ∈ E , (s, (x,y,P)) ∈ φ(E), and R ⊂ D(E), R 6= ∅,
then ER,(s,(x,y,P)) ∈ E and (sR, (x,y,P)) ∈ φ(ER,(s,(x,y,P))).
Here sR denotes the statuses in R; sRi = si for all i ∈ R.
We illustrate the role of the status indices in consistency in the following
example.
Example 1. Suppose that we have an economy with 3 agents in which all
agents are decision-makers; N = D = {1, 2, 3}. Suppose the agents agree
on status indices s1 = s2 = 1 and s3 = 2. Then, if jurisdiction J1 = {1, 2}
is formed and a level of local public good y is produced in this jurisdiction,
agent 1’s cost share would be sJ1,D1 =
1
2
, so that this agent pays 1
2
fD(y, J1). In
jurisdiction J2 = {1, 3}, agent 1’s cost share would be s
J2,D
1 =
1
3
and he would
pay 1
3
fD(y, J2), and in jurisdiction J3 = N , agent 1 would pay
1
4
fD(y, J3).
Now, suppose that agent 1 leaves the decision-making process, agreeing to
his status index s1 = 1. In the reduced economy, the set of decision-making
agents is R = {2, 3}. The cost function fR(·, ·) for the reduced economy
is diﬀerent from the cost function fD(·, ·) only for jurisdictions that include
agent 1. Specifically, fR(y, J1) =
1
2
fD(y, J1), fR(y, J2) =
2
3
fD(y, J2), and
fR(y, J3) =
3
4
fD(y, J3). The remaining agents can now reconsider not only
the jurisdictions that they want to form and the levels of local public goods
for those jurisdictions, but also their status indices. Suppose that agent 3
changes his status index to es3 = 1. This changes agent 3’s relative standing
vis-a-vis agent 2. In jurisdiction {2, 3}, agent 3 will now have to shoulder
the cost 1
2
fR(y, J1) =
1
2
fD(y, J1), whereas before he changed his status index,
he would have had to pay 2
3
fD(y, J1). But note that changing his status
index does not allow agent 2 to put a larger share of the (cost) burden of
12
producing local public good on the non decision-making agent 1, as agent
1’s share of the cost in various jurisdictions was agreed upon before he left
the decision-making process. For example, if agent 2 now wants to form
jurisdiction J1 with player 1, then player 2 will still have to shoulder the cost
fR(y, J1) =
1
2
fD(y, J1).
The status equilibrium is a consistent solution, as is shown in the following
lemma.
Lemma 1. The status equilibrium on the family E of local public good
economies is consistent.
Proof. Let E = hN,D; (wi)i∈N ; (ui)i∈N ; fDi ∈ E be a local public good
economy, let (s, (x,y,P)) ∈ SE(E), and let R ⊆ D, R 6= ∅. Let fR be the
cost function of the reduced economy ER,(s,(x,y,P)); that is,
fR(y, J) =
" X
i∈J∩R
sJ,Di
#
fD(y, J) > 0
for every y ∈R+ and J ⊆ N with J ∩ R 6= ∅. Note that this implies that
ER,(s,(x,y,P)) ∈ E . For all i ∈ R and J ⊆ N with i ∈ J it holds that
sJ,Di fD(y, J) =
siP
j∈J∩D sj
fD(y, J)
= siP
j∈J∩R sj
P
j∈J∩R sjP
j∈J∩D sj
fD(y, J)
= siP
j∈J∩R sj
hP
j∈J∩R s
J,D
j
i
fD(y, J)
= siP
j∈J∩R sj
fR(y, J) = s
J,R
i fR(y, J)
for all y ∈ R+. We now derive
s
P (i),R
i fR(yP (i), P (i)) + xi = s
P (i),D
i fD(yP (i), P (i)) + xi = wi.
Let (xi, y, J) ∈ R+ × R+ × 2N be such that i ∈ J and sJ,Ri fR(y, J) + xi =
wi. Then s
J,D
i fD(y, J) + xi = wi and, because (s, (x,y,P)) ∈ SE(E) we
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know that ui(xi, yP (i), P (i)) ≥ ui(xi, y, J). This proves that (sR, (x,y,P)) ∈
SE(ER,(s,(x,y,P))).
4.2 An axiomatization using consistency
The status equilibrium for local public good economies can be axiomatized
using the consistency property introduced in the previous subsection and two
additional axioms — converse consistency and one-person rationality.
Whereas consistency states that agreements that are acceptable for the
group of all agents should be acceptable in all smaller groups as well, converse
consistency states that if a set of status indices and a configuration constitute
an acceptable solution for all proper subgroups of agents, then they also
constitute an acceptable solution for the group as a whole. Formally, a
solution φ on E is converse consistent (COCONS) if, for every E ∈ E with
at least two agents (|N(E)| ≥ 2) and for every set of status indices s =
(si)i∈D(E) ∈ RD(E) and every configuration (x,y,P) = ((xi)i∈N , (yP )P∈P,P),
the following condition is satisfied.
If E ∈ E and for every R ⊂ D(E) with R /∈ {∅,D(E)} it holds that
ER,(s,(x,y,P)) ∈ E and (sR, (x,y,P)) ∈ φ(ER,(s,(x,y,P))),
then (s, (x,y,P)) ∈ φ(E).
This means that for an economy with 3 agents who are all decision-makers,
for example, if a set of status indices and a configuration are such that they
induce a status equilibrium in all 1- and 2-agent reduced economies, then
they must form a status equilibrium in the 3-agent economy. Hence, we
can determine if a vector of status indices and a configuration form a status
equilibrium by checking the reduced economies.
It is shown in the following lemma that the status equilibrium satisfies
converse consistency.
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Lemma 2. The status equilibrium on the family E of local public good
economies satisfies converse consistency.
Proof. Let E = hN,D; (wi)i∈N ; (ui)i∈N ; fDi ∈ E be a local public good econ-
omy with |N | ≥ 2 and let s = (si)i∈D ∈ RD(E) and (x,y,P) = ((xi)i∈N , (yP )P∈P,P)
be such that, for every R ⊆ N with R /∈ {∅,D}, it holds that ER,(s,(x,y,P)) ∈ E
and
(sR, (x,y,P)) ∈ SE(ER,(s,(x,y,P))).
Then
(s{i}, (x,y,P)) ∈ SE(E{i},(s,(x,y,P)))
for each i ∈ D. Let i ∈ D and let f{i} be the cost function of the reduced
economy E{i},(s,(x,y,P)); that is,
f{i}(y, J) = s
J,D
i fD(y, J)
for all y ∈ R+ and J ⊆ N with i ∈ J . Since
(s{i}, (x,y,P)) ∈ SE(E{i},(s,(x,y,P)))
and s
J,{i}
i = 1 for all J ⊆ N with i ∈ J , we know that f{i}(yP (i), P (i))+xi = wi
and ui(xi, yP (i), P (i)) ≥ ui(xi, y, J) for all (xi, y, J) ∈ R+× R+× 2N satisfying
i ∈ J and f{i}(y, J) + xi = wi. Knowing that f{i}(y, J) = sJ,Di fD(y, J) for
all y ∈ R+ and J ⊆ N with i ∈ J , and noting that we can make similar
derivations for every i ∈ D, we find that (s, (x,y,P)) is a status equilibrium
of E, and so (s, (x,y,P)) ∈ SE(E).
Consistency and converse consistency link solutions in larger economies
to those for smaller economies and vice versa. One-person rationality con-
siders solutions in local public good economies with one decision-making
agent only. A solution φ on E satisfies one-person rationality (OPR) if,
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for every local public good economy with one decision-making agent E =
hN, {i}; (w)i∈N ; (u)i∈N ; f{i}i ∈ E , it holds that
φ(E) = {(si, (x,y,P) | si > 0, f{i}(yP (i), P (i)) + xi = wi
and ui(xi, yP (i), P (i)) ≥ ui(xi, y, J) for all (xi, y, J)
satisfying i ∈ J and f{i}(y, J) + xi = wi}.
The one-person rationality axiom dictates that in a one decision-maker econ-
omy, the single decision-making agent maximizes his utility given his endow-
ment of the private good and the cost of producing certain amounts of local
public good in various jurisdictions when the agent has to pay all the residual
cost of local public good provision. This is a rationality assumption much
like those that prevail throughout economics.
The interaction of the three axioms consistency, converse consistency, and
one-person rationality is explained in the following lemma..
Lemma 3. Let φ and ψ be two solutions on E that both satisfy one-person
rationality. If φ is consistent and ψ is converse consistent, then it holds that
φ(E) ⊆ ψ(E) for all E ∈ E .
Proof. We will prove the lemma by induction on the number of agents.
If E ∈ E is an economy with one decision-making agent - |D(E)| = 1 — then
it follows from OPR of φ and ψ that φ(E) = ψ(E).
Now, letE ∈ E be an economy with n decision-making agents and suppose
that it has already been proven that φ(E) ⊆ ψ(E) for all economies with less
than n decision-making agents. Let (s, (x,y,P)) ∈ φ(E). Then, by CONS of
φ, we know that ER,(s,(x,y,P)) ∈ E and (sR, (x,y,P)) ∈ φ(ER,(s,(x,y,P))) for all
R ⊆ D(E), R /∈ {∅, D(E)}. Hence, it follows from the induction hypothesis
that (sR, (x,y,P)) ∈ ψ(ER,(s,(x,y,P))) for all R ⊆ D(E), R /∈ {∅, D(E)}. So,
by COCONS of ψ, we know that (s, (x,y,P)) ∈ ψ(E). We conclude that
φ(E) ⊆ ψ(E).
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Theorem 1 shows that consistency, converse consistency, and one-person
rationality characterize the status equilibrium.
Theorem 1. The status equilibrium is the unique solution on E that
satisfies one-person rationality, consistency, and converse consistency.
Proof. In Lemmas 1 and 2 we proved that the status equilibrium satisfies
CONS and COCONS. To show that the status equilibrium satisfies OPR,
let E = hN, {i}; (w)i∈N ; (u)i∈N ; f{i}i ∈ E be a local public good economy
with one decision-making agent. Note that in an economy with one decision-
making agent, the single decision-making agent present will have to pay fully
the remaining cost for each level of local public good that he wants to have
available in a jurisdiction, irrespective of his status. Hence, the set of status
equilibria of economy E is {(si, (x,y,P)) | f{i}(yP (i), P (i)) + xi = wi and
ui(xi, yP (i), P (i)) ≥ ui(xi, y, J) for all (xi, y, J) ∈ R+ × R+ × 2N satisfying
i ∈ J and f{i}(y, J) + xi = wi}. This proves that the status equilibrium
satisfies OPR.
To prove uniqueness, assume that φ is a solution on E that also satisfies
the three foregoing axioms. Let E ∈ E be arbitrary. Then, Lemma 3 shows
that φ(E) ⊆ SE(E) by CONS of φ and COCONS of the status equilibrium,
and that SE(E) ⊆ φ(E) by CONS of the status equilibrium and COCONS
of φ. Hence, φ(E) = R(E).
We conclude this section with the remark that the three axioms used to
characterize the status equilibrium in Theorem 1 are logically independent.
This is easily seen by considering the following three solutions on E . First,
consider the solution φ on E that gives each decision-making agent the same
status index, assigns agents to jurisdictions arbitrarily, has a level of local
public good equal to 1 for each jurisdiction formed, and lets each agent
consume his entire initial endowment (so that no agent pays for local public
17
good provision). Hence, φ is defined by φ(E) = {(s, (x,y,P)) | si =
1
|D(E)|
and xi = wi for each i ∈ D(E), P a partition of N(E), and yP = 1 for all
P ∈ P}. This solution satisfies CONS and COCONS, but fails to satisfy
OPR. Second, consider the solution χ on E that coincides with the status
equilibrium for economies with one decision-making agent, and is empty for
economies with more than one decision-making agent. Formally, χ is defined
by χ(E) = SE(E) if |D(E)| = 1 and χ(E) = ∅ if |D(E)| > 1. This solution
satisfies OPR and CONS, but does not satisfy COCONS. Finally, consider the
solution ψ on E that coincides with the status equilibrium for economies with
one decision-making agent, and for economies with more than one decision-
making agent assigns arbitrary status indices to agents, groups them into
jurisdictions arbitrarily, and has levels of local public good and of private-
good consumption that are such that in each jurisdiction formed its members
pay for the public good provided. So, ψ is defined by ψ(E) = SE(E) if
|D(E)| = 1 and ψ(E) = {(s, (x,y,P)) | s ∈ RD(E), P a partition of N(E),
xi · wi for all i ∈ D(E) and
P
i∈P (wi − xi) = fD(yP , P ) for each P ∈ P} if
|D(E)| > 1. This solution satisfies OPR and COCONS, but does not satisfy
CONS.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we introduced the concept of a status equilibrium for local
public good economies. A status equilibrium includes a specification of a
partition of the set of agents into jurisdictions, a production of local public
goods for each jurisdiction, an allocation of private goods for each agent,
and a status index for each agent. We stress that the status equilibrium
endogenously determines a status index for each agent in the economy. The
status index of a player determines not only what he pays for the public
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good in his allocated jurisdiction and but also what he would pay in any
other jurisdiction he might join. Players with a higher status pay a larger
share of the cost of local public good production than players with a lower
status in the same jurisdiction, as their cost shares are proportional to their
status indices. Hence, a higher status index corresponds to a larger cost share.
This is not unlike the way in which public schools (a local public good) are
financed through property taxes, property taxes, in turn, are proportional to
the value of one’s home, and the value of one’s home is related to one’s social
status. Many people choose to live in specific neighborhoods based, at least
in part, on the quality of the public school (i.e., the level of local public good
provision) and the property taxes in the neighborhood. These, in turn, are
influenced by the composition of the neighborhood in terms of income levels
and property values.
In a status equilibrium, agents’ status indices determine their relative cost
shares in each possible jurisdiction. The relative cost shares, and hence the
relative status indices of agents who end up in the same jurisdiction can be
determined just by considering the diﬀerences between their initial endow-
ment and their consumption of private good. Note, however, that the status
indices also contain information on relative cost shares of agents in hypothet-
ical jurisdictions. In pure public good economies, where all agents are by
definition in the same jurisdiction, there is no need to consider hypothetical
jurisdictions and the cost shares of agents in such jurisdictions. Hence, for
pure public good economies, we can suﬃce by specifying agents’ actual cost
shares, or their relative status in the unique jurisdiction. In this manner, we
obtain the ratio equilibrium for pure public good economies, as defined in
Kaneko (1977a,b), as a special case of the status equilibrium.
Since a status equilibrium is a new concept, there are many open ques-
tions. In the current paper, we provide an axiomatic characterization of
19
this equilibrium concept. This gives us insight into the properties of the
status equilibrium. In ongoing research we address other questions relating
to the status equilibrium. These include questions on existence, the rela-
tion between status equilibria and Lindahl equilibria, and core inclusion of
status-equilibrium consumption bundles.
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